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Clarifying the Intent of Congress:
Are the Federal Arbitration Act's

Venue Provisions Permissive or
Mandatory?
Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v.Bill HarbertConstruction Co.'

I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") allows for arbitration to be a medium by
which parties may settle disputes more expeditiously than litigation. Among other
provisions, the FAA contains venue provisions that attempt to provide guidance as
to where certain post-arbitration motions may be held. However, the language of the
venue provisions has not provided a clear-cut answer to where these motions should
be filed, as circuits have disagreed about their intended interpretation.
Some circuits have taken the position that the venue provisions are mandatory,
thus limiting venue for motions to confirm, vacate, or modify arbitration awards to
the district where the award was made. Other circuits, however, have adopted the
contrary position that the venue provisions are permissive, allowing such motions
to be brought either in the district where the arbitration award was made or in any
district that is proper under the general venue statute. This Casenote explores the
split among the circuits on the nature of the FAA's venue provisions. Cortez Byrd
Chips, Inc. v. Bill HarbertConstruction Co. addressed this issue and, in abrogating
preceding cases, held that the venue provisions of the FAA are permissive.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. ("Cortez Byrd") and Bill Harbert Construction
Company ("Harbert") entered into a contract whereby Harbert agreed to construct
"a wood chip mill for Cortez Byrd in Brookhaven, Mississippi." 2 Under the terms
of the contract, the parties agreed that all disputes arising out of the deal would be
arbitrated, and that the agreement to arbitrate and any award rendered by an
arbitrator shall be enforceable and entered, respectively, in any court having
jurisdiction.'
Cortez Byrd filed a complaint in the Unites States District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi seeking to vacate or modify an arbitration award
resulting from an arbitration proceeding between itself and Harbert.' Harbert then
filed an action in the Northern District of Alabama seeking to have the award

1. 529 U.S. 193 (2000).
2. Cortez, 529 U.S. at 196.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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confirmed.5 Cortez Byrd moved to have Harbert's action dismissed, transferred, or
stayed, arguing that venue was proper in the southern district of Mississippi because
the venue provisions of the FAA are permissive and Cortez Byrd filed its action
first.6

Harbert maintained that venue is restrictive, thus only proper in the district in
which the arbitration award was made, the Northern District of Alabama. The
Northern District court agreed with Harbert and, in denying Cortez Byrd's motion,
held that venue was only proper in Alabama.' Judgment was entered for Harbert for
$274,256.90 and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. 9 A
writ of certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court to ascertain the
nature of the FAA venue provisions and resolve the split among the circuits.'0
Relying on statutory history and being cognizant of practical consequences, the
Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit and held the FAA's venue provisions to be permissive, allowing a motion to
confirm, vacate, or modify to be brought in either the district in which the award was
made or in any district proper under the general venue statute.

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
It is well-settled that §§ 9 and 10 of the FAA must be construed the same,
whether they are found to be permissive or mandatory." In fact, "every federal
circuit court to address the issue ... has held that §§ 9 and 10 should be interpreted
uniformly."' 2 Whether both of the provisions are mandatory or permissive, however,
is an issue that has split authority throughout the circuits.' 3
Section 9 of the FAA states, in pertinent part:
If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court
shall be entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and
shall specify the court, then.., any party to the arbitration may apply to
the court so specified for an order confirming the award, and thereupon
the court must grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modified,
or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title. If no court
is specified in the agreement of the parties, then such applications may be

5. Id.
6. Bill Harbert Constr. Co. v. Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc., 169 F.3d 693, 694 (1 Ith Cir. 1999).

7. Cortez, 529 U.S. at 193.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 196 (stating that venue for motions to confirm, vacate, or modify awards was exclusively in
the district in which the arbitration award was made).
10. Id.
I1. See In re VMS Secs. Litig., 21 F.3d 139 (7th Cir. 1994); Sutter Corp. v. P&P Indus., 125 F.3d 914
(10th Cir. 1999); Sunshine Beauty Supplies, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of
California, 872 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1989).
12. P & P Indus. v. Sutter, 179 F.3d 861, 861 n.4 (10th Cir. 1999).
13. Cortez, 529 U.S. at 196.
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made to the Unites States court in and for the district within which such
award was made. 4
Section 10 of the FAA deals with vacatur but is similar to § 9 in that it states that
"the United States court in and for the district wherein the award was made may
make an order vacating the award upon application of any party to the arbitration. 5
The courts of appeal have struggled with whether the nature of the provisions as
mandatory or permissive is to be ascertained merely by the language of the statute
or if further inquiry is necessary. 16
A number of courts have looked beyond the exact wording of the statute to
ascertain the nature of the venue provisions.' 7 The Seventh Circuit has held that one
is to look beyond the express language of a statute only where (1) the statutory
language is ambiguous or (2) a literal interpretation would lead to an absurd result
or (3) a literal interpretation would thwart the purpose of the overall statutory
scheme.'" The ambiguity in §§ 9 and 10 of the FAA arises from the seemingly
restrictive wording Congress chose in drafting the statutes.' 9 When Congress intends
for a statutory provision to be restrictive, it uses unambiguous terms to express its
*20
Multiple cases hold that ordinary canons of statutory construction
intention.
suggest that Congress would have used stronger language than'such application may
be made' or 'may apply' if the intention was to restrict the power of a federal court
in FAA cases. 2'
The majority of courts of appeal have held the provisions to be permissive22
because a mandatory interpretation would create absurd results. First, a mandatory
interpretation of § 9, which would give only the district court in the district where
the arbitration award was made power to confirm the award, would render § 3
meaningless.23 If the district court giving the award did not have the power to
confirm or vacate the award, the action must be dismissed rather than stayed, for

14. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1994) (emphasis added).
15. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (emphasis added).
16. See generallySutter Corp., 125 F.2d 914; P&P. 179 F.3d 861; In re VMS, 21 F.3d 139; Sunshine
Beauty Supplies, 872 F.2d 310; Smiga v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 766 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1985);
Central Valley Typographical Union No. 46 v. McClatchy Newspapers, 762 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1985);
Island Creek Coal Sales v. City of Gainesville, Florida, 729 F.2d 1046 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v.
ETS-Hokin Corp., 397 F.2d 935 (9thCir. 1968).
17. See Sutter Corp.,125 F.3d 914; P&P, 179 F.3d 861; In re VMS, 21 F.3d 139; Smiga, 766 F.2d
698.
18. In re VMS, 21 F.3d at 144 (citing United States v. Real Estate Known as 916 Douglas Ave., 903
F.2d 490, 492 (7th Cir. 1990)).
19. Id. (emphasis added).
20. P&P, 179 F.3d at 869 (referencing the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. § 270b(b), which states that"[ejvery
suit instituted under this section shall be brought ... in the United States District Court").
21. 9 U.S.C. § 9. See P&P, 179 F.3d 861; Apex Plumbing Supply, Inc. v. U.S. Supply Co. 142 F.3d
188 (4th Cir. 1998); Smniga, 766 F.2d 698.
22. Sutter Corp., 125 F.3d 914; P&P, 179 F.3d 861; Apex Plumbing Supply, 142 F.3d 188;In re VMS,
21 F.3d 139; Nordin v. NutriSystem, Inc., 897 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1990); Smiga, 755 F.2d 698.
23. See P&P, 179 F.3d at 869; In re VMS, 21 F.3d at 144. Section 3 of the FAA instructs "any of the
courts of the United States" to "stay the trial of the action" pending arbitration if that court is "satisfied
that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration" under the parties' agreement.
9 U.S.C. § 3.
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that court would have no power to take any further action in the case.24 Second, the
courts recognize that a mandatory interpretation would prevent a court with
jurisdiction from proceeding with a case to its conclusion." Thus, a court having
jurisdiction must dismiss the parties and force one of them to sue in another forum
to confirm or vacate his or her award.26 The United States Supreme Court held this
process to be a "pointless and wasteful burden on the27 supposedly summary and
speedy procedures prescribed by the Arbitration Act.,
Finally, the majority of courts of appeal hold that a mandatory reading of §§ 9
and 10 would thwart the purposes of the FAA.2" One of the purposes of the FAA, as
stated by the United States Supreme Court, is the "rapid and unobstructed
enforcement of arbitration agreements., 29 A restrictive interpretation of these
provisions, thereby restricting venue and compelling parties to file in multiple
forums to see their matter through to conclusion, violates this purpose. °
The minority of courts of appeal have held the venue provisions to be
mandatory. 3' The reasons proffered by these circuits for adopting a mandatory
interpretation are not extensive. In Unites States v. ETS-Hokin Corp., the arbitration
award was made in California, and a motion to vacate was later filed in Arizona. 2
The court offered little reason for its holding, but simply stated "we agree with the
District Court of Arizona that it was without jurisdiction to set aside the arbitration
award. 33 The Central Valley court followed its earlier decision of ETS-Hokin,
finding venue proper only where the arbitration award was made. 4 Four years later,
the Ninth Circuit again, citing ETS-Hokin and Central Valley as precedent, held the
venue provisions of the FAA to be mandatory." Hence, the Ninth Circuit found
itself bound by precedent that simply stated a conclusion, devoid of any analysis or
reasoning.
The Ninth Circuit is not alone in its propensity to adhere to unpersuasivelyreasoned precedent. The Eleventh Circuit simply stated it was bound by the Fifth
36
Circuit's Naples' case holding that § 9 was mandatory, calling it "§ 9's command.
However, the court "did not explain what it meant by '§ 9's command' or why that
command compelled or even supported the result reached., 37 Further, the Sutter
court refused to give weight to the Naples decision, stating that it does not directly
answer the question whether venue under § 9 is mandatory. Consequently, circuit

24. See P&P, 179 F.3d at 869; Sutter Corp., 125 F.3d at 919.
25. In re VMS, 21 F.3d at 145.
26. id.
27. Id. at 145 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,27 (1983).
28. See cases cited supra note 22.
29. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 23.
30. In re VMS, 21 F.3d at 144; Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 23.
31. Sunshine Beauty Supplies, 872 F.2d at 312.; Central Valley, 762 F.2d at 744; Island Creek, 729
F.2d at 1050; ETS-Hokin, 397 F.2d at 938-39.
32. 397 F.2d 935.
33. Id. at 939.
34. Central Valley, 762 F.2d at 744.
35. Sunshine Beauty Supplies, 872 F.2d at 312.
36. Sutter Corp., 125 F.3d at 919 (quoting Naples v. Prepakt Concrete Co., 490 F.2d 182, 184 (5th
Cir. 1974)).

37. Id.
38. Id.
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decisions adopting a mandatory reading of the venue provisions were all abrogated
by the United States Supreme Court in Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert
Construction Co. 9

IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant case, the issue before the United States Supreme Court was
whether the venue provisions of the FAA are permissive or mandatory4" and in
particular whether Cortez Byrd's motion to confirm or modify
the arbitration award
4
was properly filed in the southern district of Mississippi. '

The Court began its analysis by concluding that resolution would not be
forthcoming by merely "parsing the language" of the statutes.4 2 As the Cortez Byrd
Court argued, the use of the word "may" is not per se conclusive of congressional
intent to provide for a permissive authority.4" Further, Harbert demonstrated that
language seemingly permissive in nature could be held mandatory." Thus, the Court
focused on statutory history and the practical consequences of Harbert's position to
resolve the issue before it.45
The Court examined the venue provision of § 9, allowing a binding agreement
selecting a forum for confirming an arbitration award, and its relation to §§ 10 and
11, as any forum selection agreement must coexist therewith.46 The Court reasoned
that if §§ 10 and 11 were mandatory in nature then any action to confirm the award
brought in a forum by agreement of the parties must be suspended if the responding
party objected.47 A new action to modify or vacate the award must then be initiated
in the district where the award was made, and if the award was upheld, the parties
would then move back to the forum agreed upon to resume confirmation of the
award.4" The Court discarded this effect as one intended by the statute stating that
"Congress simply cannot be tagged with such a taste for the bizarre."" The Court
further indicated its disapproval of holding such venue provisions mandatory in that
"nothing, indeed, would be more clearly at odds with both the FAA's 'statutory
policy of rapid and unobstructed enforcement of arbitration agreements,' or with the
desired flexibility of parties in choosing a site for arbitration."5o

39. 529 U.S. 193.

40. Coriez, 529 U.S. at 196.
41. Id. at 195.
42. Id.
43. Id. ("The word 'may' ... usually implies some degree of discretion[, but] [t]his common-sense
principle of statutory construction ... can be defeated by indications of legislative intent to the contrary
")(quoting
..
United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 706 (1983)).
44. Id.
45. Id.
at 198.
46. hM.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 201 (citing Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 23).
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Next, the Court examined the effects that a mandatory interpretation of the
venue provisions would have upon § 35" of the FAA and determined that it would
place the provisions in "needless tension" being capable of entanglement only by
disruption of existing precedent.5 2 Previous case law dictates, and Harbert even
acknowledges, that the court entering a stay order under § 3 retains jurisdiction over
the proceeding and power to confirm any forthcoming arbitration award. 3 However,
a restrictive interpretation of the FAA's venue provisions would provide that the
court having power under § 3 would not retain jurisdiction to confirm an ensuing
arbitration award.- The Court declined to follow Harbert's position and instead
affirmed existing precedent and avoided creating tension within the provisions of the
FAA.
Finally, the Court considered the effect Harbert's interpretation of the provisions
would have in the wake of arbitrations held abroad. 5 The FAA provides for "liberal
choice of venue for actions to confirm awards subject to the 1958 Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and the 1975 InterAmerican Convention on International Commercial Arbitration. 56 Adopting
Harbert's position would preclude FAA action in the United States to confirm,
modify, or vacate awards rendered abroad not covered by either convention.57 The
Court stated that while these actions would not necessarily be barred for lack of
jurisdiction, they would be defeated by restrictions on venue, and anomalies like that
are to be avoided if possible.5" Therefore, the Court declined to adopt Harbert's
position due to the "anomalous results" that it would inevitably create. '9
Consequently, due to the fact that a mandatory interpretation of the FAA's
venue provisions would hinder the rapid enforcement of arbitration agreements and
desired flexibility of parties in choosing a forum, place needless tension on
provisions within the FAA, and create anomalous results in the aftermath of foreign
arbitrations, the United States Supreme Court, abrogating previous contrary
60
decisions of the courts of appeal, held the venue provisions of the FAA permissive.

V. COMMENT
The federal circuits have disagreed for fifteen years as to whether the venue
provisions of the FAA are permissive or mandatory. 6' The courts holding the

51. Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. §3) (stating "that any court in which an action 'referable to arbitration under
an agreement in writing' is pending 'shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action
until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement.').
52. Id.
53. Id. at 202.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 203.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 202.
60. Id. at 204.
61. Id. at 196 (stating that cases in 1968, 1984, 1985 and 1989 held the provisions to be mandatory
and cases in 1986, 1990, 1994, 1997, 1998 and 1999 held the provisions to be permissive).
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provisions mandatory restrict venue for post-arbitration proceedings to the district
where the arbitration award was granted.62 Conversely, the courts holding the
provisions permissive allow venue for such proceedings not only in the district
where the award was made, but also in any other district proper under the general
venue statutes.63 The Cortez Byrd Court sought to resolve this discrepancy by
holding the venue provisions to be permissive and, in so doing, abrogated preceding
cases to the contrary. 64
Holding the venue provisions to be permissive, the Supreme Court has expanded
allowable forums for post-arbitration disputes in jurisdictions that previously
adopted a mandatory reading of the FAA venue provisions. Rather than be confined
to the district that made the arbitration award to bring a motion to vacate or confirm
an award, parties to the arbitration dispute may now bring their motions in the
district where a substantial part of the events leading to the dispute occurred, or
where a substantial part of the property that is subject to the action is located.65
Parties may now bring post-arbitration motions in any district that has subject matter
and personal jurisdiction.66 The decision in the instant case has afforded parties the
right to choose a convenient forum in which to be heard.
By abrogating the cases holding the venue provisions to be mandatory, the
instant case has reinstated the policy behind the FAA of rapid and unobstructed
enforcement of arbitration agreements.67 The Cortez Byrd Court recognized that
jurisdictions following a mandatory interpretation of the venue provisions in the
FAA were in fact slowing down the process of bringing arbitration proceedings to
their conclusions. In those circuits, district courts that would otherwise have
jurisdiction over arbitration cases often dismissed parties and forced them to return
to the district that made the award.68 Mandatory interpretations of the provisions
were creating wasteful burdens on courts that otherwise hadjurisdiction, effectively
postponing parties' abilities to finalize arbitration proceedings. Recognizing that
these courts should be allowed to exercise jurisdiction over such parties, the Supreme
swiftness and efficiency to the enforcement of arbitration
Court returned
69
proceedings.
The Cortez Byrd decision laid to rest the impractical consequences of the
mandatory interpretation of the venue provisions. It is well-settled that a court with
the power to stay an action under § 3 of the FAA has the further power to confirm
any ensuing arbitration award.7° It is inconceivable "to be open to question that,
where the court has authority under the statute ... to make an order for arbitration,
the court also has authority to confirm the award or to set it aside for irregularity,
fraud, ultra vires or other defect."'', However, a mandatory interpretation of the

62.
935.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

See Sunshine Beauty Supplies, 872 F.2d 310; Central Valley, 762 F.2d 741; ETS-Hokin, 397 F.2d
See Sutter Corp., 125 F.3d 914; In re VMS, 21 F.3d 139; Smiga, 766 F.2d 698.
Cortez, 529 U.S. 193.
Id. at 197 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2) (1994)).
Apex Plumbing Supply, 142 F.3d at 191.
Cortez, 529 U.S. at 198.
See P&P, 179 F.3d 861; In re VMS, 21 F.3d 139; Siuiga, 766 F.2d 698.
See generally Cortez, 529 U.S. 193.
Id. (citing Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263, 275-76 (1932)).
Id.
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venue provisions of the FAA would not allow such a court to confirm the award
unless it was the same court where the award was made, thereby placing the venue
72
provisions in needless tension with § 3 of the FAA. In fact, an exclusive reading
73
of §§ 9 and 10 would "effectively read § 3 out of the Act." Examining the FAA
in its entirety, it is evident that a permissive interpretation is necessary to reconcile
all sections.74
A mandatory interpretation also creates impractical results in the proceedings
of arbitrations held abroad." Certain sections of the FAA provide for a liberal
choice of venue for actions to confirm awards made subject to specific international
and foreign conventions.76 In this instance, the result of a mandatory interpretation
of the venue provisions would preclude any action under the FAA in the courts of
the United States to confirm, modify, or vacate awards rendered in foreign
77
arbitrations that are not covered by the specified conventions. The United States
courts may have jurisdiction over such proceedings, but due to the mandatory
interpretation of the venue provisions, they would be without proper venue. Cortez
Byrd recognized that Congress did not intend to create venue gaps which take away
78
with one hand what it has given by way of jurisdictional grant with the other.

VI. CONCLUSION
This decision gives deference to the practical consequences of the possible
interpretations of the venue provisions and reasonably concludes that a mandatory
interpretation is impractical and inconsistent with the intent of Congress and the
policy of the FAA. Thus, the inconsistency in the circuits that has persisted with
regard to the FAA venue provisions is now resolved, and the minority, mandatory
position is now abrogated. The future of arbitration proceedings should entail a
uniformity among the jurisdictions coextensive with the policy of rapid and
unobstructed enforcement of arbitration awards.
DARYNNE L. O'NEAL

72. Id. at 199.
73. Susan C. Rabasca, Venuefor Motions to Confirm or Vacate ArbitrationAwards under the Federal
Arbitration Act, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 653, 659 (1989) (citing Nil Metals Servs.., Inc. v. ICM Steel
Corp., 514 F. Supp. 164, 166 (N.D. I1. 1981)).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 200.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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